

UPLAND PUBLIC LIBRARY
UPLAND, CALIFORNIA

THE GARBAGE EXPLOSION CHARLES A. SCHWEIGHAUSER

THE
NATION

SEPTEMBER 22, 1969 35 cents

12-698 P1-12298
UPLAND PUBLIC LIBRARY
123 EAST 0 ST
UPLAND CA 91796

Private Deals & Public Interest

The Politics of Tobacco

EDWARD SCHNEIER

Labor & Race

Confrontation in Pittsburgh

CHARLES C. ROBB

Nixon's Drug Bill **GEOFFREY C. STOKES**

NONVIOLENCE & AGGRESSION

Ronald Sampson on 'Gandhi's Truth'

Jack Leavitt on 'Men in Groups'

August, a larger group turned up at the stadium and succeeded in blocking trucks. Police arrested twenty-six, including eight women, on the charge of loitering. Most of those arrested were employees of the Bidwell Cultural and Training Center, another black organization in the Northside ghetto. The Bidwell Center, started after Pittsburgh's 1968 riots (touched off by the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King), has had some success in training outside the building trades. But its experience with the building contractors and unions made it an ally of Nate Smith and Operation Dig.

Among those arrested was the Rev. James J. Robinson, then president of the Bidwell Center. At the hearing in police court, Robinson explained why the stadium was the target: "The stadium is the real shining example of bigotry and everything that the labor unions stand for." The police magistrate dismissed the charges, and counseled moderation, but the blacks were beyond moderation. "We're going on the jobs and stop them," declared Nate Smith. "Now it's time for war."

At that point the Black Construction Coalition was announced. It was to be composed of Operation Dig, the Bidwell Center, and almost every other black organization in the city.

A week later the Black Coalition staged its first action, again against the stadium. More than 100 demonstrators appeared, blocked trucks, and became involved in several confrontations with construction workers and police. Eight were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.

The contractors' response was to obtain a court injunction limiting picketing at the gates to the stadium. The Black Coalition's counter response was to call for the mass demonstration at the stadium the Monday before Labor Day. The war had been declared.

As in all wars, once the combat begins, the price of peace goes up. When negotiations began after the Labor Day truce, it was apparent that the Black Coalition, having tested its strength in the streets, was not going to weaken at the bargaining table.

Two months ago the contractors and unions could have satisfied the blacks by accepting Nate Smith's Operation Dig II for 110 jobs. Several weeks ago, the contractors, in an apparent effort to deflate the black protest, put forth their own proposal to provide apprentice training for ninety to a hundred men. The blacks rejected it then because they had not been involved in developing it. When the same program was put forth a second time at the post-truce negotiating session, Nate Smith tore it up and threw it in the face of the builders' representative.

The Black Coalition then put forth its demands: a minimum of 1,130 jobs, excluding laborers, in one year; within two years, a minimum of 40 per cent black membership in each of the craft unions. The Coalition specified that 20 per cent of the trainees be recruited from "detention facilities" in western Pennsylvania. The Coalition also demanded that no training program take more than eight months; that qualifications for journeyman status be determined by a committee including representatives of the Black Coalition.

It was obvious that these demands would never be agreed to by the contractors and unions, and the blacks regarded them as no more than starting points for negotiation. "Our position is negotiable," said Nate Smith. "We know eight months for training is low. We left room for them to come up with a figure. We're willing to go up to fifteen months. But they won't come down at all."

"As for the 40 per cent," Smith went on, "the black population of Pittsburgh is not 40 per cent. We're willing to go down to 10 per cent. But they haven't offered anything."

The contractors and unions, naturally, felt they had offered something in their original plan with some later modifications. "We don't feel it got proper consideration," said one contractor. The Black Coalition considered the industry plan just long enough to decide that it left the apprenticeship system basically intact, with no guarantee that there would be black men in the IBEW or the Iron Workers union. Their answer was "Black Monday."

PRIVATE DEALS & PUBLIC INTEREST

THE POLITICS OF TOBACCO

EDWARD SCHNEIER

Mr. Schneier is in the Political Science Department at City College, New York. He is the editor of Policy-Making in American Government, recently published by Basic Books.

There are billboards in the South which read: CAUTION: ANTI-SMOKING PROPAGANDA MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR ECONOMIC HEALTH. And well it might. Smoking is big business in the South. In Kentucky it accounts for 40 per cent of the state's total income, 77 per cent of its cash crops. It is the most important single industry in both North Carolina and Virginia, and the leading cash crop of five states. Half a million farm families and 100,000 fac-

tory workers in these five states earn their livelihood from Lady Nicotine. For many Southern Congressmen it is more important that they vote "right" on tobacco than that they champion the cause of States' rights.

Cigarettes are more than a business. They are a regular and accustomed part of the daily routines of 60 million Americans. The average smoker consumed 9,100 cigarettes—twenty-five a day—last year, and by so doing reduced his life expectancy by six and a half years. Every day 4,000 teen-agers and young adults took up smoking as a like number of their parents and friends began the torturous process of kicking the habit. For every one smoker who succeeded in giving up, there were hundreds

who would have liked to. Surveys have shown that as many as eight smokers in ten are dissatisfied with their habit and would like to quit. Nine in ten believe that smoking is dangerous to their health.

As an issue of public policy the smoking and health controversy has a number of interesting facets. Attempts to control the tobacco industry confront the classic dilemma of regulation: minor benefits for the many can be gained only at the expense of major reverses for the few. The hazards of smoking, though real, are remote, intangible and diffuse. Smoking damages the health of millions, but for any given individual the degree of damage is at best problematic. On the other side of the coin, however, any significant decline in the number of cigarettes consumed would have an immediate, tangible and drastic impact on the economic well-being of tobacco farmers, fertilizer merchants, cigarette factory workers, cellophane and aluminum foil manufacturers, salesmen, vending machine companies, and perhaps even the corner druggist. And how would the state and federal governments replace the more than \$4 billion in tax revenues which they derive each year from cigarette taxes?

The American political process usually works to avoid regulatory issues. The interests of tobacco growers, of cigarette manufacturers, and of television broadcasters (who derive almost 11 per cent of network advertising billings from cigarettes) are immediate and direct, and of course well represented in Washington. The tobacco lobby was able to bring more than twenty distinguished doctors and medical researchers before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce to argue that the health case against smoking is not clearly established. The Governors of two Southern states testified on behalf of their major industries. Thirty members of the House—all but three from major tobacco-producing districts—introduced legislation on behalf of the tobacco industry. And of course the tobacco growers, tobacco workers, the broadcast industry, and the major manufacturers were also represented.

Weighed in the balance against this impressive array of knowledgeable and concerned citizens is a motley, ill-coordinated hodgepodge of public officials, private citizens and independent researchers speaking on behalf of that elusive concept known as the public interest. In contests such as these the general public almost invariably loses out.

What makes this year's smoking and health controversy interesting and significant is the very real possibility that for once the public interest may triumph. There are encouraging signs, moreover, in this and in other current controversies, that a new and very meaningful concept of the public interest may be evolving. In a system long accustomed to defining the common good as the sum of private deals, the change will not be wrought overnight, but there are signs of a shift. In this controversy it is the tobacco industry and not the public which is on the defensive.

The major forces behind the shift have not been generally associated in recent years with progressive policies. The key agent of change has been the Public Health Service. The 1964 Report of the Surgeon General's Advisory

Committee, with its stark and startling conclusion "that cigarette smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action," was the opening gun in the government's war on cigarettes. Traditionally a conservative agency, dedicated to the maintenance of close ties with the medical profession and with local health officials, the Public Health Service (PHS) had concluded as early as 1956 that there was a definite causal relationship between excessive smoking and lung cancer. Not until 1964, however, was the PHS willing to suggest that the health hazards of smoking were of sufficient magnitude to warrant public action. The PHS has little direct power. It has been able to encourage further research and to mount a modest educational campaign. But by the very fact of its having found smoking a public hazard, the Surgeon General's report became the critical catalyst to the development of new policies. What the PHS did in 1964 was to transform the problem of smoking into the issue of smoking, and a problem must be perceived as an issue before the policy-making process can begin.

Once smoking had been defined as a public issue, once the problem had been injected into the public arena, the balance of political power began to shift. No longer simply a contest between private groups such as the American Cancer Society on the one hand and the tobacco industry and its allies on the other, smoking became an issue on which Congress, the press, the medical profession, and various agencies of government were forced to take a stand.

In 1964, two forces in particular were moving in on tobacco. Most important were the courts. Citing the findings of the Surgeon General, literally hundreds of lawsuits were initiated against the cigarette manufacturers by the families of individuals who had died of lung cancer and related diseases. Even if unsuccessful, these suits were a source of major embarrassment to the industry. Second in importance was the Federal Trade Commission. Like most regulatory agencies, the FTC has not recently been noted for the vigor with which it has defended the public interest. In the characteristic cycle of institutional development, the FTC is in its "mature" stage, a stage when, in Emmette Redford's words, "the agency has lost the original political support, when it has found its position among the contending forces in society, and when it has crystallized its own evolved program. It then becomes part of the status quo and thinks in terms of the protection of its own system and its own existence and power against substantial change." Such agencies seldom rock the boat. But in 1964, within months of the Surgeon General's report, the FTC rocked and shocked the tobacco industry with a proposal to require a health warning on all cigarette packages and in all cigarette advertising.

It was this FTC order which sent the tobacco lobby scurrying to Congress and which resulted in enactment of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965. That act represented an overwhelming victory for the tobacco industry. One minor concession—the warning on the pack—was traded for a blanket four-year pre-emption of all other governmental actions in the field. By the terms of the 1965 law no federal agency, no state or

local government could act in such a way as significantly to control the cigarette industry. And as an added bonus the warning helped to absolve manufacturers from any legal responsibilities for premature deaths.

The only meaningful victory for the anti-smoking forces in 1965 was to limit the effect of the act until June 30, 1969. It is that magic date which has a second time put Lady Nicotine on trial. And in the interim her opponent has grown in strength. Two significant allies have been added to the anti-smoking coalition. The medical profession, through some very aggressive state medical associations, has become an increasingly vocal supporter of the Surgeon General's report.

It was widely rumored in 1964 that the AMA had reached an agreement in Congress whereby tobacco states' opposition to Medicare would be traded for AMA neutrality on the issue of smoking and health. Though agreeing that smoking was "a serious health hazard," the AMA's policy position was, in the words of FTC Com. A. E. MacIntyre, "precisely the position of the tobacco industry." If an explicit agreement with the industry ever existed, however, it is not now in effect. The AMA no longer defends tobacco interests; and it has been largely at the urging of state medical societies that California, New York and Utah have taken steps to curb tobacco sales. In the most far-reaching proposal the California state assembly passed an act in May which would have banned all advertising of cigarettes in the state. If Congress fails to act, the pre-emption provisions of the 1965 act will lapse, and strict state laws such as these will be allowed to go into effect.

The final, and in some ways the most surprising source of anti-smoking pressure, has come from the Federal Communications Commission. If the Federal Trade Commission is in its "mature" stage, then surely the FCC is in its dotage. In a special study of the regulatory commissions which James Landis prepared for John F. Kennedy in 1960, the FCC was described as more subject to pressure, more subservient to industry, and more in need of a total overhaul than any other agency. The FCC has not been overhauled, but it has become a key factor in the smoking and health controversy. In 1967 it ruled that broadcasters carrying cigarette commercials must give a significant amount of time to information on the health hazards of smoking. More recently, on February 6, the FCC proposed to adopt rules which would ban the broadcast of cigarette commercials by all radio and television stations. In view of the overwhelming evidence, publicly sanctioned by the Bureau of Public Health, that smoking constitutes a serious health menace, the FCC ruled the "presentation of commercials promoting the use of cigarettes is inconsistent with the obligation imposed upon broadcasters to operate in the public interest."

A revived coalition has apparently emerged. At best loosely coordinated, it includes such old stand-bys as the American Cancer Society and a surprisingly heterogeneous group of public and private agencies: the AMA and American Dental Association, the FCC and FTC, ASH (Action on Smoking and Health), the Public Health Service, and a growing number of state legislatures. The actions of these groups once again have confronted the

tobacco lobby with the need for Congressional action.

More than ninety members of the House of Representatives sponsored bills this term dealing with the smoking issue. They ranged in severity from those proposing a simple extension of the 1965 law, to bills proposing an outright ban on all radio and television ads, a requirement that the warning statement be strengthened and placed on the front of the pack, and an authorization for the Public Health Service to regulate the length of cigarettes. The House, acting with unusual dispatch, quickly passed a modified version of these bills. Six of thirty-seven members of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce have given up smoking, but only five could be prevailed upon to vote against the combined interests of the tobacco and broadcasting industries. A floor motion to send the bill back to committee for strengthening amendments was defeated by a vote of 252 to 137.

The coalition which rallied to the defense of tobacco in the House was a familiar one. Only six Southern Democrats—Wright Patman and five Floridians—voted to recommit the bill. Only a handful of Northern Democrats, most of them from rural districts, voted against the motion. Among Republicans a similar pattern prevailed. Of the fifty-two voting for recommitment (and against the tobacco lobby) only three—Kyl, Mayne and Schwengel of Iowa—represented Midwestern agricultural constituencies. Thus it was at base the old farm bloc which passed the bill. It was not a partisan issue, it was not a split between liberals and conservatives: it was the quintessence of the old politics.

Rep. Joe Skubitz of Kansas, the only Northerner to sponsor a bill acceptable to the tobacco industry, gave away a part of this game when he rhetorically asked a witness at the House hearings what would happen if the tobacco crop were reduced:

If you stop raising tobacco you are going to go into raising more cattle (there are 8,700 livestock farms in the 5th District of Kansas). You are going to go into raising more grain products (with 6,500 commercial farms, feed grains are the second most important product in the district), and you are going to be in competition with a lot of states that are now in the production of these commodities, and perhaps add to their surpluses. Is that correct?

Correct or not, an alliance of economic convenience has long united the grain and livestock farmers of the Midwest and the cotton and tobacco growers of the South. And it is not simply the fear of competition that holds the alliance together. Call it logrolling, accommodation, horse-trading or whatever, it is the system of bargaining which has dominated American politics for close to four decades. It is a system in which public policy is arrived at through a simple summing of private deals. So long as each mind his own business, each major interest from tobacco to corn, and from airlines to atomic scientists, is free to write its own ticket. Government exists to ratify these programs.

This system, which Prof. Theodore Lowi of the University of Chicago calls "interest-group liberalism," operates in almost every important policy arena. Educators make education policy, bankers make banking policy, military men make military policy, railroads make railroad policy.



New York Times Book Review

"No! No! No! No! You Haven't Got it Cheerful Enough! You Haven't Got it Light! I Want it Merry—I want It To Bounce! Let's Take It Again from 'Caution, Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous. . . .'"

The system has operated most smoothly in the field of agriculture where, in Lowi's words "government-by-conflict-of-interest" has been elevated "to a virtuous principle." Under this system the public interest, if such an interest is conceded to exist, is simply one more interest among many. Thus Joseph P. Cullman, chairman of the Tobacco Institute, has attacked the actions of the FCC and FTC as follows:

A great diversity of interests is involved. Any legislation or regulation affecting cigarette advertising or labeling would have important consequences for farmers and growers of tobacco, processors, distributors, retail merchants, and cigarette manufacturers, as well as the general public. . . . It is wholly inappropriate for a decision of this scope to be made by any Federal administrative agency whose jurisdiction and expertise are limited to one particular aspect of this complex national problem.

Leaving aside the substantive merits of Mr. Cullman's statement, what is incredible in it is the assumption that the public interest is simply one among many to be considered in making policy. The interests of the general public should not be ignored, Mr. Cullman seems to be saying, but neither should it be exalted above the interests of tobacco growers, processors, et al.

It is possible to run a government according to the tenets of interest-group liberalism. Indeed in some policy arenas the system has worked quite well. But it is a philosophy of government that is inherently shortsighted. All interests are not organized, and therefore all interests are not represented in the making of policy. Moreover, there are general public interests which are difficult to represent but which transcend the interests of any particular groups. Public health is one such issue. And even if we confine ourselves simply to problems of economic injury, the arguments are not all on the side of tobacco. All of us share some of the costs of cigarette damage in cleaning public buildings, trains, planes and hotels, of forest fires caused by smoking, of higher life insurance rates attributable to

the higher mortality rates of smokers, of higher fire insurance rates, and of the higher costs of automobiles and public facilities engendered by the need to accommodate to the needs of smokers. Arthur T. Roth of the Franklin National Bank—in a report presented at a Congressional committee hearing—has estimated that the total annual costs of such items related to smoking is more than \$10 billion a year. When this figure is compared with the \$3.7 billion received from tobacco sales, a plausible anti-cigarette case can be made on purely economic grounds.

That this case did not prevail in the House is not surprising. As noted earlier, the interests of the industry, in contrast with those of the anti-smoking forces, are immediate and direct. One could hardly expect Republican Rep. Tim Lee Carter, whose Kentucky district includes 36,000 tobacco farmers, not to champion the industry's cause. And the bargaining structure of the House is such as to virtually insure the victory of such special interests. Senators, however, have broader constituencies and broader policy perspectives. The bargaining structure of the Senate is much less specialized. If a new concept of the public interest is in fact emerging in our politics, it is here that we are likely to find it.

As this is written, the Senate Commerce Committee is beginning its consideration of the House bill. The composition of the committee adds to the problems of the tobacco lobby. Unlike its counterpart in the House, which is one-third Southern, the nineteen-man Senate committee includes only four Southerners, just two of whom—Spong of Virginia and Hollings of South Carolina—are from major tobacco states. Both Chairman Magnuson, of the full committee, and Moss of the Consumer Affairs subcommittee, who now has charge of the bill, have been consistent advocates of strong regulation. There is a very good chance that the bill will die in committee. And if this happens, or if the bill is filibustered to death, or if it is defeated on the Senate floor, or if the House and Senate conferees are unable to compromise, the pre-emption provisions of the 1965 law will die. With those restrictions no longer in force, the FCC and FTC, the California legislature, and other state and local governments will be free to act as they see fit.

It is this frightening possibility which has sent the industry and its allies running for cover. In the true spirit of interest-group liberalism, the tobacco industry has once again pledged itself to a program of self-regulation. In preference to allowing the FCC to set an arbitrary date, the National Association of Broadcasters in June announced plans to phase out all TV and radio ads by 1973. A month later, the tobacco industry itself proposed a 1970 ban provided that the Senate passes the pre-emption bill.

What self-regulation will do is postpone tobacco's day of reckoning. As the president of the National Association of Broadcasters bitterly lamented on hearing of the manufacturers' action, it's "no great sacrifice on their part" to switch to other media. "They will save \$200 million with full knowledge that consumption of cigarettes will not decrease." Self-regulation was also proposed in 1964 in a similar attempt to ward off an adverse vote in the Senate. The nine leading cigarette companies hired

Robert Meyner, former Governor of New Jersey, to administer the code. The broadcast industry too established voluntary regulatory standards. Both the tobacco and broadcast industry codes attempted to avoid unsubstantiated health claims and direct appeals to youth. Athletes, seductive women, uniformed professionals, and models under 25 years of age were banned from media ads, as were health claims ("not a cough in a carload," "more doctors smoke Camels . . .") or promises of social prominence to be derived from smoking.

In some respects these rules were effective. Athletes lost a major source of revenue. College newspapers were effectively declared off-limits by the tobacco code. Health claims have disappeared from cigarette ads. But as a staff memorandum of the Broadcast Code Authority put it in 1967, overall cooperation on the part of the manufacturers has been "more token than real." Lorillard withdrew from the manufacturers' code in 1966. In 1967, the American Tobacco Company, arguing that the broadcast code was sufficient, also withdrew from the tobacco industry agreement. They then took the view, as Warren Braten, a former manager of the broadcast code's New York office, put it, "that if a commercial was approved by the television networks there should be no reason for the code authority to raise any questions." And of course the networks themselves refused to question ad material on the ground that this was the function of the code. Self-regulation became a farce. Its only remaining function was to ward off Congressional action. As Braten says, "Broadcast self-regulation became synonymous with trade association lobbying."

Whether effective or not, however, self-regulation derives from a radically different set of political values than does regulation by a public agency. It is this point, this question of a fundamental philosophy of government, which underlies Senate consideration of the issue. The real question is this: Is the public interest in the question of smoking and health sufficient to justify appropriate public action: or is this a question which can be trusted to the private sector? Former Governor Meyner posed this larger question quite clearly when he told the House Commerce Committee:

The outcome of your deliberations in this matter . . . will reach far beyond the cigarette industry alone. The whole concept of industry self-regulation is at stake here. For if Congress now turns its back on this serious effort and resorts to broadened government control, future efforts at self-regulation will be discouraged. What might have been the start of a new era of cooperation between industry and Government will become just another step down the road of business-Government conflict, leading to slower and ever more inefficient regulation.

To put Meyner's alternatives somewhat differently, the issue at stake is whether Congress will affirm the unique status of the public interest and the special role of government in defending that interest; or, alternatively, whether it will continue to encourage the blurring of the lines between the public and private sectors, and in essence define the public interest as a summing of private deals.

In a previous article ("The New Tide of National Politics," *The Nation*, January 22, 1968) I argued that we were approaching a significant break-point in our political

history. Substantial numbers of Americans are disaffected with the interest-group liberals' approach to politics and are searching for a new public philosophy. In the 1968 elections two candidates in particular, George Wallace and Eugene McCarthy, were able to capitalize on this mood of restlessness. Though poles apart on most specific issues, Wallace and McCarthy were alike in denouncing government catering to special interests. Both were alike in calling for majority rule rather than government by coalitions of minorities.

This vague and not very clearly articulated call for a new public philosophy appears to be bearing fruit not just in the area of smoking and health but with regard to such issues as automobile safety, conservation, pollution. But like invocations of patriotism, the public interest can be a last refuge of scoundrels. It can be a dangerous concept, and there are aspects of the smoking and health controversy which point these dangers up.

One of the more serious potential problems is the tendency for popular majorities to be rough on the First Amendment. Freedom of speech is not clearly involved in the present instance. As the United States Court of Appeals ruled in 1968:

Promoting the interest of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of the interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. As a rule, it does not affect the political process, does not contribute to the exchange of ideas, does not provide information on matters of public importance, and is not, except perhaps for the admen, a form of individual self-expression.

True as this may be, the line between activities which can be protected by the First Amendment because they are political, and those which need not be because they are commercial is not easy to delineate. Is violence on TV a proper subject for public action, or is it permissible, as Congressman Broyhill of North Carolina puts it, "to pollute the mind but not the lung"? And if government can take steps to control violence, what other kinds of content can it regulate?

A second difficulty is in guaranteeing expert action. One of the signal advantages of interest-group liberalism is that it locates power and knowledge in the same hands. The tobacco industry people probably know as much about tobacco as anyone—certainly they know more than does the FCC. That they are almost undoubtedly blinded by bias does not alter the fact of their knowledgeability, and a plausible argument can be made that this knowledgeability entitles them to special consideration. Just as the views of welfare recipients should perhaps be given special consideration in formulating welfare policies, or students in making educational policy decisions, so perhaps should the concerns of tobacco growers and producers

NOTICE TO SUBSCRIBERS

Because of postal regulations, *The Nation's* mailing list must be arranged according to Zip Codes. Therefore—with any correspondence about address changes, renewals, etc.—please enclose the address label from your *Nation*. If you don't have a label, be sure to include your Zip number, and *be sure it is correct*. Without it, we cannot find your name plate.

be given extra weight in making policy in this area. This is not to say that they should be allowed to make that policy but only that their views should be specially sought and specially considered. In a large and complicated society it is particularly important to find effective means of decentralizing some decision-making powers into the hands of those most immediately concerned with the issues at hand.

These caveats notwithstanding, the emergence (or perhaps it is a re-emergence) of a public philosophy in America cannot help but have a salutary impact on our

political system. With such a philosophy, in the words of New York City's Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, Bess Myerson Grant, "We need not surrender our social and physical environment to the vast corporate and political bureaucracies, which now too often stand beyond any meaningful public accountability." The assertion of the public's interest in the issue of smoking and health is part of a much larger rebellion against the increasing privatization of the political process. Even if self-regulation and private control win out in this instance, the battle has been joined.

Greece: A Chance for Democracy

W. G. FORREST

Mr. Forrest is an instructor in ancient history and a dean of Wadham College, Oxford. He is the author of The Emergence of Greek Democracy (McGraw-Hill) and A History of Sparta (Humanities Press).

Friends of the military junta claim that there was no democracy in Greece before the coup of April 21, 1967; its enemies say that the revolution destroyed democracy. Paradoxically both are right.

The Greece which was invented in 1833 was poor and primitive; it was still poor and comparatively primitive a hundred years later. Economically there had been little industrialization and even by 1967 some 50 per cent of the population was still employed on the land. Politically, a constitution of a sort was established in 1844 and another in 1864, when a Parliament was also created. But 300 politicians do not make a Parliament unless they have some Parliamentary marrow in their bones and the politicians who assembled for the early Parliaments, more often than not, were the same local barons who had run the near-independent local units of Turkish Greece. They were supported by their constituents for the power they could exercise for them and the patronage they could give them; ideology was a rare commodity and it was small wonder that General Metaxas, as late as 1936, could dissolve Parliament with Parliament's own initial approval. He could not destroy democracy for there was none to destroy.

But he did other things. In the political establishment's corridors of power little was changed, but at street level his persecutions turned a Communist Party, which had acquired some artificial significance by electoral accident in 1936, into an organization which was ready to become the chief focus of resistance to the Germans after his death in 1941. Communists had become numerous; those who were prepared to associate with them also had increased. Ideological thinking was creeping in.

But if it crept in still further during the Nazi occupation, it seemed to have been swept out again by the end of the Civil War in 1949, a war which left Greece broken—morally, economically and politically. The disreputable Left had been destroyed and this brought chaos to the Center. Britain, America, the traditional establishment had apparently won. The forty-four parties which pre-

sented themselves at the elections of March 1950 inspired little hope for a restored "democracy." The institutions themselves were unsatisfactory and the old corruption, inefficiency, nepotism and intimidation prevailed. Besides there were still many Greeks in prison for no apparent reason.

Nevertheless there were some Greeks, particularly among the youth of the country, who were beginning to see that the old-style political game was outdated; that the need was for efficient government; that there could be no efficient government without a stable parliamentary system (or, of course, a stable dictatorship). And even among the politicians there began to appear an awareness of change. For the elections of November 1952 the right-wing parties came together under General Papagos; the Center grouped itself uneasily around General Plastiras; the Right gave itself an overwhelming majority of seats (247 against 53) on a minority vote, and so began a government which did more good for democracy in Greece than had any before it.

That is a judgment that would shock any doctrinaire democrat. The administration set up by Papagos and taken over by Karamanlis in 1955 kept itself in power by gross electoral chicanery. But it did keep itself in power until 1963 and when it fell it was no longer a mere electoral coalition; it had become a party. Meanwhile it had been efficient and stable, and its stability, which continued against an apparent background of parliamentary opposition, conditioned Greeks to the idea that the opposition might one day take power. It also conditioned the opposition to produce a rival party to fight the elections of 1961 and to win the elections of 1963.

The old-style politicians of the Center were slow to find an answer to Karamanlis' National Radical Union (ERE). It was opposed at the elections of 1956 by a loose coalition of no less than eight parties which gained more votes but substantially fewer seats than ERE. Fortunately, it was not a coalition that could have lasted. Further left the picture was brighter. The Communists were banned but a new party had been created, the United Democratic Left (EDA), under Communist influence but with many non-Communist members and an impeccably moderate program. It had joined the coalition of 1956 but in 1958