Talks with Chou En-lai

Edgar Snow

Aerospace Dinosaurs — Peter Barnes
Selling Death — Thomas Whiteside
General Stilwell — John K. Fairbank
Kissinger & Rogers — John Osborne
tain doubt. One of the doubts is whether it is or can be the permanent contribution to government that Kissinger and the President think it should be. A structure and a process so thoroughly dominated by and dependent upon Henry Kissinger is likely to be no more permanent than his tenure at the White House. Maybe the President knew this when he wrote that letter to Kissinger in January.

John Osborne

Cigarette Ads in the Magazines

Selling Death

by Thomas Whiteside

In the period preceding the removal, by act of Congress, of all cigarette advertising from radio and television at the beginning of this year, spokesmen for various tobacco companies were insistent, in interviews with reporters, that the industry planned no undue increase in the amount of cigarette advertising in the press when the ban on cigarette commercials went into effect. Some weeks have now passed since cigarette commercials were taken off the air. During that time I have been interested in whether the press, and in particular magazines, would abstain from taking advantage of this situation by soliciting or accepting, for profit, any additional print advertising for a product that has been shown in medical studies (which have been reported in the press itself) to be the leading cause of lung cancer among men and a significant contributing factor to premature death from coronary heart disease, emphysema and a number of other diseases. I have also been interested in exploring the extent to which the tobacco manufacturers have felt themselves restrained, in planning their cigarette-advertising campaigns in the print media for the period after the ban on radio and TV cigarette commercials, by the realization that any excessive increase in the number of print ads they took out might provoke the Federal Trade Commission to take some kind of regulatory action, for example requiring health warnings to be displayed in all print advertising.

By any such standards of restraint, the behavior of the tobacco companies and the magazines alike since the ban on cigarette commercials went into effect has been alarming. A prime example exists in the advertising pages of Life. In the fall of 1969, in response to a letter from Sen. Frank E. Moss of Utah, attempting to determine the attitude of various publishers to accepting an increased volume of cigarette advertising after a cutoff of cigarette commercials from the air, Andrew Heiskell, the chairman of Time, Inc., publicly assured the senator that his company would continue to take cigarette ads but that it had no intention of accepting any "overwhelming" amount of cigarette advertising as a result of the TV cutoff. What has happened since this assurance can be gathered by the fact that whereas the first three issues of Life in 1970 carried twelve-and-a-half pages of cigarette advertising, the first three issues of the same magazine in 1971, immediately after the ban on cigarette ads on TV went into effect, carried twenty-two pages of cigarette advertising—all of them in color. And a comparison of the number of ads carried in the February 5 issue of Life this year with that in the first issue in February of last year shows that the number of cigarette ad pages has jumped from two to eight.

On February 8 of this year, Life carried a full-page ad in The New York Times in praise of what it called "Life's Editorial Power." The ad asked, rhetorically, "Who else had the photo of the National Guard about to fire at the Kent State kids? The reminiscences of Nikita Khrushchev? The 242 pictures of one week's American war dead in Vietnam?" It went on, "That kind of editorial excellence gives Life more impact than any other magazine. And gives your ad more impact than it can get anywhere else."

How can any responsible publishing corporation use a claim of editorial excellence to hold forth the unblushing assurance, applying in this case to cigarette manufacturers, that ads for a product, the use of which is officially recognized as a major cause of disease and death each year, would have "more impact" than anywhere else? If Life, which carried those 242 pictures of one week's American war dead in Vietnam, were to carry pictures of the number of American cigarette
smokers who succumbed to lung cancer alone in the course of an average week, it would need not 242 pictures, but at least four times that number. How can any publisher—anyone—make money out of selling advertisements for a product that is known to cause death on a disastrous national scale year after year? The record of *Time* is no more encouraging than *Life* in this respect. The first three issues of *Time* for 1970 carried eight pages of cigarette advertising. The first three issues of the same magazine for 1971 carried a little less than 21 pages of cigarette advertising. And *Newsweek* is not much better than *Time*. In the first three months of 1970, *Newsweek* carried 23 pages of cigarette advertising, and for the first quarter of 1971, *Newsweek* has scheduled 50 pages of cigarette advertising—an increase of 108 percent. And nobody can accuse the editors of *Newsweek*, any more than one could accuse the editors of *Time* and *Life*, of not knowing the facts about the causal relationship between cigarette smoking and lung cancer and other fatal diseases. Nor can the editors of *Look* claim innocence about the facts concerning cigarette smoking and disease. The fact that *Life* and *Look* are in financial trouble can hardly be viewed as an acceptable excuse for their trying to prop up their corporate health at the expense of the health of their readers.

With certain honorable exceptions, such as *Mademoiselle* and *Glamour*, two Condé Nast publications that, because they are meant to appeal to young women, have decided against taking cigarette advertising, the women's magazines as a whole are soliciting and accepting a new flood of cigarette advertising. What makes the use of this medium of advertising so particularly detestable is the knowledge that although women are less prone to lung cancer than men, the lung-cancer rate among women smokers in the last fifteen years has shown an alarming rise. Further, women, when they try to stop smoking, appear to have greater difficulty than men in breaking themselves of the habit. To counteract the trend among the smoking population generally toward cutting down on cigarette consumption, tobacco manufacturers are making great efforts to develop the market among women—in particular by putting out new brands of cigarette "imged" in such a way as to seem particularly attractive in the female market. Huge sums have been poured into the promotion of new "women's" cigarettes such as Virginia Slims, put out by Philip Morris, and Eve, which Liggett & Myers has introduced this year on a national scale with huge double-page color spreads in the major magazines of general circulation and in the women's magazines. The introductory ads for women are headed, "Farewell to the ugly cigarette. Smoke pretty. Eve." "The accompanying copy goes on, "Hello to Eve. The first truly feminine cigarette—it's almost as pretty as you are. With pretty filter tip. Pretty pack. Rich, yet gentle flavor . . . . Women have been feminine since Eve. Now cigarettes are feminine. Since Eve." The ad is illustrated with a color picture of a woman's hand, amid wild flowers, holding a pack of Eve, and the pack design shows the head of an innocent-looking woman gazing out from a profusion of flowers and greenery depicted in mock-tapestry style. The deliberately contrived themes in this particular advertisement of innocence and of temptation, and an equally deliberate concealment, by the hand that is shown holding the package, of the message printed on the side, "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health," surely make this one of the most deceitful cigarette advertising campaigns yet devised.

What is perfectly clear from all this is that the legal measures that have been taken so far to bring some measure of governmental control over cigarette advertising are altogether insufficient to restrain the tobacco industry from huge advertising campaigns in the furtherance of what can only be regarded—considering what is known about the relationship between cigarette smoking and various diseases—as manslaughter on a massive scale. And the press as a whole has been undeterred from acting as co-conspirator in this manslaughter for the sake of whatever additional profits publishers have been able to seize as a result of the ban on cigarette commercials on the air. Obviously, some drastic action has to be taken to correct this situation. Under the Public Health Cigarette Smok-
ing Act of 1970 the Federal Trade Commission is pre-
empted until July 1, 1971 from prohibiting cigarette
advertising or even from requiring that health warn-
ings be plainly visible in all cigarette advertising;
thereafter, if the FTC wishes to act in these respects,
it must give Congress six months’ notice of its inten-
tion to do so. This preemption was inserted in the Act
through the pressure of tobacco industry lobbyists,
who calculated that any such moves by the FTC might
be forestalled in Congress with the help of the tobacco
industry and its commercial and political allies. Even
if such moves against cigarette advertising by the FTC
were permitted by Congress, the resulting delay of
approximately one year in controlling or prohibiting
cigarette advertising would certainly have a contribu-
tory effect on the scores of thousands of human fatal-
ties that occur in this country each year as a result of
cigarette smoking. Under the circumstances, it does
not seem to me that the FTC is in a position to bring
an effective end to the systematic promotion for profit
of this clearly lethal product. Consequently, I suggest
that the problem of cigarette advertising be placed
under the jurisdiction not only of the FTC but also of
the Food and Drug Administration, and that all cig-
arette advertising in this country be banned under the
provisions of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act,
which authorizes the FDA to ban or control the sale
or promotion of substances that because of their toxic-
ity are hazardous to public health. The toxic sub-
stances covered by the terms of the Hazardous Sub-
stances Act include those that are capable of causing
harm to humans “through inhalation.” This definition
fits cigarettes and cigarette smoking quite precisely,
and I believe that if the Food and Drug Admin-
istration does move promptly to place cigarettes and
cigarette smoking under the provisions of the Haz-
ardous Substances Act for the purpose of bringing the
promotion of cigarettes under adequate federal regu-
lation, the Federal Trade Commission would then also
be able either to ban all cigarette advertising or to
require that strong health warnings be prominently
displayed in the cigarette advertising that is allowed.

Boeing, Boeing, Gone

Aerospace Dinosaurs

by Peter Barnes

Seattle

If some of our giant aerospace corporations are becom-
ing obsolete, it is because, like the dinosaur, they are
unable to adapt; for example, to the idea of “suffi-
ciency” in sophisticated weaponry. Thus, the US has
gone through battleships, bombers, three generations
of sea-launched Polaris missiles, two generations of
Minutemen and now is building Poseidon and Minute-
man III, both topped with multiple warheads and both
capable of devastating any target in the world from
virtually any place in the US or under the ocean. If
that isn’t enough what is? Although the military con-
tinues to press for new gadgets, it has become increas-
ingly clear to Congress and the public (as evi-
denced by substantial opposition to the ABM) that an
unending investment in ever more sophisticated weap-
on systems is at best redundant and at worst counter-
productive, for it simply triggers a counter response
from the “adversary.”

Aerospace executives talk about quantum jumps: the stagecoach, the railroad, the automobile, the
propeller airplane; the subsonic jet. Next is the super-
sonic jet. But who needs it? The subsonic jets, includ-
ing the massive new jumbos, will do for the foresee-
able future. What is needed is not faster airplanes but
cleaner, more efficient ways of traveling short distances.

As the products of the aerospace giants gain in
sophistication, they become too expensive. Cost over-
runs plague almost every military contract. (The F-111
not only cost too much, but didn’t work.) Commercial
aircraft are likewise soaring beyond prices they’re
worth. A single 747 costs $23 million; an SST will cost
about twice that, if it gets built. Airlines which took
out huge loans to pay for their 707s and DC-8s are
deeper in debt trying to pay for their 747s. BOAC and
Air France, which have been flight testing the Con-
corde, report that costs per passenger mile will proba-
bly be twice that of the subsonic jets. Where on earth
will the airlines get the money to buy supersonics – and
even if they can get it, why should they spend it?

Contributing to the obsolescence of the aerospace