ANNALS OF ADVERTISING

CUTTING DOWN

At midnight next January 1st, all television and radio commercials for cigarettes will go off the air for good. Their removal by that time is mandatory under federal law. This ban is the principal provision of the National Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which was passed by both houses of Congress last spring for the purpose of protecting smokers from being exposed, over public airwaves, to advertisements for a product that the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service has declared to be hazardous to health.

The act is an extraordinary piece of legislation. It was passed in spite of massive pressure that had been brought to bear against it, and against the regulation of cigarette advertising generally. The battle raged, spearheaded by the tobacco industry, the broadcasting, printing, and advertising industries, and their lobbyists and publicists. This was not a battle for that reason that for years had proved itself invincible against a counterforce of scientists and public-health and public-interest advocates who, armed with formidable statistics on the damage to health the smoking of life caused by cigarette smoking, had sought to protect consumers by requiring all cigarette advertising to provide adequate warnings of these dangers.

The emphasis on controlling the content of cigarette advertising rather than the sale of cigarettes themselves is an indication of the power that advertising has attained in American society, particularly for products that, like cigarettes, have no useful or artistic function but that come under the merchandisers' category of "pleasure products," the need for which is essentially subjective. Such subjective needs are capable of being aroused and maintained on a socially acceptable scale with the help of advertising. Fifty years ago in this country, advertising was a mere adjunct to the selling of consumer goods, nowadays it lies at the core of the whole merchandising and consuming process.

The merchandising of cigarettes on a large scale became practical with the development, around the time of the First World War, of a slightly alkaline tobacco which allowed smokers to inhale without an unpleasantly displeasing effect. (Tobacco smoke is an alkaline substance which causes cough reflex when inhaled.) Mass production of cigarettes really got under way in the twenties, with the help of big advertising campaigns and high pressure selling. The estimated number of cigarettes consumed in the adult population increased between 1920 and 1930. Between the latter half of the twenties and the latter half of the forties, cigarette consumption, urged on by hard-driving advertising campaigns on networks, was more than doubled. In the forties, the increase continued in the form of commercial television, with both the F.T.C. and the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that the F.T.C. had already recommended a ruling that a strong health warning be put on all cigarette packages and signs and appear in all cigarette advertising, including advertising on television. The committee gave this proposal considerable support in its report, and the F.T.C. was encouraged to pursue the line of action. The F.T.C. gave no support from President Johnson, either; in fact, they said that the White House was likely to have taken an agency to delay putting its rule into effect. All told, no matter what the Surgeon General said about the malign effects of cigarette smoking, the opinion to the regulation of cigarette advertising was that of formidable proportions. Tobacco is a one-billion-dollar-a-year agricultural product, a crop that the Department of Agriculture regularly subsidizes with millions of dollars in price supports. It is a one-billion-dollar-a-year consumer product, from which federal and state governments derive almost four billion dollars a year in excise taxes, and tobacco advertising has accounted for one-third of the total advertising receipts of the nation's networks. In 1964 the F.T.C.'s report, the tobacco companies were spending two hundred and fifty million dollars a year on advertising, three-fifths of which went for TV commercials. The weight of the combined forces of the tobacco industry and its allies was felt in the form of legislation in Congress. In summary, the Surgeon General's report found that "cigarette smoking in a health hazard of sufficient importance to the American public, habitual, and appropriate remedial action warranted." This call for remedial action aroused efforts of the popular Front to secure a national ban on television and radio commercials for cigarettes.

In June, 1964, Paul Rand-Dixon, the chairman of the Commission, declared in testimony before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that the F.T.C. had decided on a ruling that a strong health warning be put on all cigarette packages and signs and appear in all cigarette advertising, including advertising on television. The committee gave Mr. Dixon a hostile reception. The F.T.C.'s proposed ruling led those sympathetic to the tobacco industry to conclude it of indiscriminating against a legally solid product and of misapportioning the legislative funds of Congress. The F.T.C. got no support from President Johnson, either; in fact, they said that the White House was likely to have taken an agency to delay putting its rule into effect. All told, no matter what the Surgeon General said about the malign effects of cigarette smoking, the opinion to the regulation of cigarette advertising was that of formidable proportions. Tobacco is a one-billion-dollar-a-year agricultural product, a crop that the Department of Agriculture regularly subsidizes with millions of dollars in price supports. It is a one-billion-dollar-a-year consumer product, from which federal and state governments derive almost four billion dollars a year in excise taxes, and tobacco advertising has accounted for one-third of the total advertising receipts of the nation's networks. In 1964 the F.T.C.'s report, the tobacco companies were spending two hundred and fifty million dollars a year on advertising, three-fifths of which went for TV commercials. The weight of the combined forces of the tobacco industry and its allies was felt in the form of legislation in Congress. In summary, the Surgeon General's report found that "cigarette smoking in a health hazard of sufficient importance to the American public, habitual, and appropriate remedial action warranted." This call for remedial action aroused efforts of the popular Front to secure a national ban on television and radio commercials for cigarettes.

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DECEMBER 19, 1970

THE NEW YORKER

The message of the Virginia Slims commercials, sung to a strong contemporary beat, was "You've come a long way, baby, to get where you're at. You've got your own cigarette now, baby. You've come a long, long way." Within a year of the opening of this campaign of liberation, the sale of Virginia Slims rose to four and a half billion cigarettes, or two hundred and twenty-five million packs. And by the time cigarette commercials go off the air for good, Virginia Slims will be selling at the annual rate of nearly five and a half billion cigarettes; that is, more than one hundred million packs. One of the considerations underlying the highly successful campaign for Virginia Slims, and the very large sales of other brands in the same period, was that over the years the number of women smokers had been increasing steadily and had come to constitute a large share—about forty per cent—of the total cigarette market. Women had also come a long, long way in other respects. And when the girl picked up his pack, she told him, "I sell cigarettes, and I don't consider myself a woman's libber."

In 1966 to 1970, there were the commercials for Silva Thins, a hundred-millimetre cigarette that was introduced by the American Tobacco Company. The Silva Thins commercials seemed to have been designed for the sub-masochistic crowd as well as the handful of girls who might try to throw her out of his car—when smoking a Virginia Slim and was obviously enjoying the experience.

The television campaigns persuading people to smoke cigarettes went on relentlessly through the fifties and sixties, until, for a while, while viewing people in the tobacco business and the cigarette-advertising business on their attitudes toward smoking and health, I did not come across a single executive who gave any credence to the Surgeon General's report. Then Did the moving force behind the Benson & Hedges campaign that began in 1965—Mary Wells Lawrence herself—believe there was any causal relationship between smoking and lung cancer or other diseases? "My button is the advertising business," Mrs. Lawrence told me. "I am not a scientist."

The information provided to me on this subject—usually that includes the Surgeon General's report—leaves me in a state of total indecisiveness. When the government shows me beyond doubt that no matter who you are and what your makeup is cigarettes can cause you to contract these diseases, I'll search my soul and the moral problem. She added, "I sell liquor, automobiles, airline travel, and cigarettes. I have all sorts of opportunities. It is impossible for me to run an advertising agency and to make my pockets on advertising one 45 grossly sold product and no other." As the promotional gimmicks, the things that have the, the laughter in the cigarette commercials increased, so did the mass of evidences gathered in the cigarette commercials around, in the four-year-old, and the others of the forty-five million packs. And by the time cigarette commercials go off the air for good, Virginia Slims will be selling at the annual rate of nearly five and a half billion cigarettes; that is, more than one hundred million packs. One of the considerations underlying the highly successful campaign for Virginia Slims, and the very large sales of other brands in the same period, was that over the years the number of women smokers had been increasing steadily and had come to constitute a large share—about forty per cent—of the total cigarette market. Women had also come a long, long way in other respects. And when the girl picked up his pack, she told him, "I sell cigarettes, and I don't consider myself a woman's libber."

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CROW'S FALL

When Crow was white he decided the sun was too white,
He decided it glared much too whitely.
He decided to attack it and defeat it,
He got his strength flush and in full glitter.
He clawed and clawed in vain.
He aimed his hooks direct at the sun's center,
He laughed himself to the center of himself
And attacked.
At his battle cry, trees grew suddenly old;
Crows blackened.
But the sun brightend—
It brightend, and Crow returned charred black.
He opened his mouth but what came out was charred black.
"Up there," he managed,
Where white is black and black is white, I won.
—Ted Hughes

A decade ago, Henry Geller, then chief counsel of the F.C.C., opened his mouth in a long, eloquent, and impassioned way to describe to the public the fairness doctrine as it applied to cigarette advertising "in the public interest and in the public welfare for the good of the American people." The result was a regulatory nightmare that continues to this day.

Before long, however, the tobacco industry—of which the broadcasting industry was a part—had a new law on the books, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which had long since been amended and expanded to include advertising as an integral part of the sale of tobacco products.

In June, 1967, the Federal Communications Commission ruled that the fairness doctrine was inapplicable to cigarette advertising. This was a landmark decision in the history of the tobacco industry.

The ruling was made by the Federal Communications Commission, which has the power to regulate the broadcast of cigarette advertising, and the decision was based on the interpretation of the fairness doctrine.

The fairness doctrine requires that broadcasters give equal time to opposing views on public issues, and the decision of the F.C.C. was that the fairness doctrine did not apply to cigarette advertising.

The decision was made after a long legal battle, and the decision was upheld by the Supreme Court, which ruled that the fairness doctrine did not apply to cigarette advertising.

The decision was a major victory for the tobacco industry, and it was a major setback for those who sought to regulate cigarette advertising.

The decision was made in 1967, and it was a major victory for the tobacco industry.
to the National Interagency Council on Smoking and Health—an organization that carries out some coordinating functions between the public-information arms of the American Cancer Society, the National Tuberculosis Association, the American Heart Association, and other health societies—and outlined the steps needed to sustain the F.C.C. decision.

"After I'd sent off the letters, I was invited to a meeting of this Interagency Council, and when I turned up at it I pointed out to the representatives of these health organizations that the first petition opposing the F.C.C. decision had already been filed with the F.C.C.—'I forget whom it was on behalf of—and that within sixty days someone had to answer that petition with sound legal arguments if the F.C.C. decision was to be upheld," Banzhaf said. "I felt very strongly that the decision could not be saved unless responsible health organizations banded together to support it with competent legal counsel. But the representatives of the health organizations I was trying to persuade turned me down, one after another. In words I'll never forget. One of them said to me, 'Let me tell you the economic facts of life. Your organization depends on free broadcasting time for our fund-raising drives. We are not going to jeopardize that time by getting involved in this move.' Another told me, 'We're a health organization, not a legal organization. We can't get involved in legal action.'

"Others suggested that they felt they could get more from the broadcasters by cooperating with them in a friendly way than by becoming their legal antagonists. Even before the F.C.C. decision, the American Cancer Society had been preparing some cautious commercials about smoking. Its representatives felt they could have these spots used on the air here and there, and didn't want to injure their chances of doing that. Also, the health organizations were used to thinking of the problem just in terms of disease. Their attitude was that you don't cure a disease. They were all very sympathetic, but they felt themselves dependent on the good will of the broadcasters, so they simply weren't prepared to get into a fight. In sum, they wouldn't do anything and wanted to leave it to me to act. I felt rather bitter about this.

"All that summer of 1967, petitions to the F.C.C. to rescind its decision were being filed. All together, there were about a dozen of them. The petitions filed included those on behalf of the three major networks, of the National Association of Broadcasters, of the American Tobacco companies in this country, of the Tobacco Institute, and even of the Federal Communications Bar Association, a group of attorneys practicing in the communications industry. The petitions were filed by some of the top law firms in the country, including the Washington firms of Arnold & Porter—the firm the F. Fortas left to go on the Supreme Court—and Covington & Burling.

"With great difficulty, I decided to go ahead myself and to prepare arguments for presentation to the F.C.C. in support of my original petition and against the legal arguments opposing it and the F.C.C.'s decision. I was continuing with my job at the law firm, but felt uncertain about my position there, and the time I had available for this outside private project was very limited. But I got my reply brief supporting the original decision in, and I remember that on September 8th, a Friday, I left my office at eleven-thirty at night. I picked up an early edition of Saturday's New York Times and read that the F.C.C. had rejected the broadcasters' and tobacco industry's petitions and had unanimously reaffirmed its decision requiring a significant amount of free rebroadcast time to be offered against cigarette commercials. When I read that, I went right back to my office and got to work again. The reason for that was my knowledge that the reaffirmation of the F.C.C.'s decision could now be reviewed in any of the federal courts of appeal in the country, and that the petitioners for review would certainly be permitted to those courts. I knew I'd have to be prepared for real trouble.

"The trouble that Banzhaf had in mind was the possibility that the tobacco and broadcasting forces, in petitioning the federal courts of appeal to review the F.C.C. decision, might take advantage of Banzhaf's limited resources by deliberately filing a petition in a court difficult for Banzhaf to get to from New York—a court in Los Angeles, for example. Also, he reasoned, they might..."
file a petition for review in a court they thought would be friendly to their case— a court that would uphold the Constitutionality of the fairness doctrine in vigorous terms. However, Banzhaf quickly decided that the best way to forestall such moves was to do his own forum shopping. From his point of view, the National Interstate Council on Smoking and Health and was most favorable to his side. He hoped to find a court in Washington that would not be friendly to his case, and that the Commission did not find that it needed any help from us in defending its decision. Our lawyer agreed. He told us in his opinion that it was a most strong case and had the help of excellent attorneys, and

There is a 20 m. p. h. world
700 miles at sea.

After you get off of a 600 m. p. h. jet, it's kind of nice to wander around our relaxed little island. Everything and everybody runs a little slower here than almost any place else on earth.

Golfers don't rush from hole to hole.

Sun lovers don't have to wade through a sea of people on our pink beaches. We have so many! Sightseers don't have to wade through waves of people on our tiny little squares.

On our island, you'll find just about every sport that you'll find any place else, plus one thing that you'll never find any other place on earth:

That's why so many people who come to Bermuda keep coming back.

Some who never leave

They've discovered there is only one Bermuda.

Tell a travel agent you want to join them. Or write Bermuda:

610 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10020 or 6 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois 60602.
Did your Dad ever say he expected great things from you?

This Polaroid Land camera is one of the most automatic cameras in history. (It will let you focus and shoot, but there's not much else it will let you do.)

Our Countdown Model 350.

It not only gives you a color picture in a minute, its electronic development timer even tells you when your picture's "freeze" a fast tennis serve.

"I knew, of course, that we had only a thousand-to-one chance of getting WNBC-TV's license revoked. But I also knew that the value of the station was something like a hundred million dollars. That doesn't even include studio and transmitter—all that's the probable market worth of the frequency that the government allows the owner to operate on, free of charge.

We thought we would give the station something to be afraid of when we presented our petition. We wanted to take even a one-in-a-thousand chance of losing a hundred million dollars?"

"WNBCTV challenged our petition. Their people claimed that the ratio we had given of ten cigarette commercials to one anti-smoking message was inaccurate. It was close to three to four to one, they said. But we challenged their challenge, and asked them to produce 100 percent accuracy.
Bubble, bubble, toil and trouble.

For you, we brutish, our champagne as a foaming, light-hearted thing.

A delicious thought of the roses of the noblest word and so forth.

For me, it’s the loveliest of all.

Making marigolds it’s always difficult, even if you use the latest streamlining on blooms.

This may work it so well for better.

And regards.

We are only the finest of premier grapes, plucked from tempestuous.

We refuse to give up the pinching grapes to the growing man, much as the grape.

And we insist on giving it all the building it deserves before offering it to the public.

Once upon a time, Paul Masson was his first gold medal in Paris in 1901, we’re been in the hands to impress you.

We may make fewer friends that way.

But we make them to last.
To get the rights to play 'Smoke Gets in Your Eyes,' we went to Chappell & Co., the music publishers who own the Corky original. Representatives of a cigarette company had been there before us. They'd tried to buy the song for one of their brands. But Chappell & Co. had turned them down. We explained what we wanted. The man we talked to at Chappell happened to have just given up smoking. We got the rights to play 'Smoke Gets in Your Eyes' in a Cancer Society anti-smoking message for just a hundred and sixty-eight dollars and fifty cents, which represented the bare cost of the legal paperwork involved. The message had been a big hit. I think. I've heard that some stations wouldn't run it, because they believed it was too strong. Also, I understand that one tobacco company brought pressure that resulted in our parody of the Western cowboy being taken off a West Coast station, and that was probably because the owners became persuaded that the line 'Cigarettes, they're killers! was too strong."

While the anti-cigarette forces were gradually mobilizing themselves, the tobacco industry was not idle. During the first quarter of 1969, the tobacco industry spent a good deal more money on television commercials than it had in the corresponding period of the previous year. On network television, the industry spent forty-five million dollars on advertising, as opposed to forty-five million dollars and a half million dollars for the first quarter of 1968, and its expenditures for spot announcements on individual stations rose by more than a million dollars, to a total of eleven million two hundred thousand dollars. Furthermore, most of this money was spent on advertising in prime time, in which the largest possible audiences could be reached.

With a very few exceptions—notably the Doyle Dane Bernbach and the Ogilvy & Mather agencies, which do not accept cigarette accounts—Madison Avenue appears to remain pretty loyal to the tobacco industry. An article on the subject in February, 1969, in Advertising Age reported:

A telephone check of 23 New York agencies [that do not have cigarette accounts], each large enough to absorb a sizable cigarette account without being absorbed by it, shows there are few that would decline one. Aside from long-time non-smokers like Doyle Dane Bernbach and Ogilvy & Mather, only four agencies in that (major-billing) category said that they would unequivocally be interested in a cigarette account—and two of those equivocated with unequalled persistence, suggesting that the offer of $1,000,000 worth of Pullman business might bring about a quick change of policy. Ten executives for each of the other 19 agencies replied, generally with no hesitation, that they would take on a cigarette account "gladly, with pleasure," and "certainly."

The industry had also been doing its best—through the Tobacco Institute, which is its central trade organization and lobbying arm, in Washington—"the persuasive congressmen that there was nothing provably injurious about smoking cigarettes. With the help of the public-relations firm of Hill & Knowlton, the Tobacco Institute also issued sheaves of press releases and background materials, the gist of which was that the Surgeon General's report and the rest of the medical documents dealing with the relationship between smoking and lung cancer and other diseases were filled with fallacies, and, in fact, were altogether unsaleable. Then, late in 1967, the Tobacco Institute called up reinforcements, contracting for the services of the Tiller Corporation, a sort of public-relations and management-consultant firm in New York. The Tiller Corporation was handled by Rosser Reeves, the brilliant former advertising man who for a number of years had been chairman of the board of the advertising agency Ted Bates & Co. and the undisputed prince of the hard sell in television advertising. At Ted Bates in the early fifties, Reeves had a strong hand in promoting filter cigarettes, such as Viceroy and Kool, that were put out by Brown & Williamson. He had helped make the sales of these brands leap wildly with commercials containing such claims as "The nicotine and tar trapped by the exclusive Viceroy filter cannot reach your nose, throat, or lungs."

"We were the first people to do it," Reeves has said. "We were the first people to say, 'You don't have to smoke a cigarette; you can smoke a filter cigarette.'"

New Reeves, after having retired from the agency business and done some dealing in real estate down in Jamaica, had returned to Madison Avenue, set himself up in a suite of offices on the thirty-fifth floor of the Newsweek Building, and was consulting with half a dozen large corporate clients—"all big jungle cats, too," he said—on whatever public-relations or managerial problems afflicted them. He had an opportunity to interview Reeves on the subject of tobacco shortly after Tiller took on the Tobacco Institute account, and although I gathered that..."
The aroma, superb. And these qualities come through any way you serve it. Let Martell say nod with eloquence.

MARTELL...THE LARGEST SELLING COGNACS OF THE WORLD.
You make the odds...

You can bet that nobody can make a bad martini with Boisiere.

At 6:15 A.M., you’re in no shape to tell the big hand from the little hand.

Just open your eyes and see the big numbers poking through the fog.

They’re very comforting things to wake up to, our digital clock radios. Instead of hands to decipher at a time when you need all the help you can get, they give you your clear numbers.

That doesn’t have to be by the dawn’s early light. Because they already have their own soft electric eyes.

And they let you fall asleep to up to 60 minutes of music. And then wake up to more magic. And if that isn’t enough to get you up on time to see the time, there’s an insistent buzzer that can take care of you.

Maybe you thought clock radios were just something to keep you up. These are also something to listen to. With big, dynamic speakers to go with the big numbers. And Solid-State devices so they keep going a long time.

The “Planned” Model RC-750. For people who only listen to your earphone and a 2-stage nightlight.

See the new kind of clock radios today. At any Panasonic dealer. And tomorrow, you won’t have to worry which hand is bigger.

PANASONIC
just slightly ahead of our time.

At 6:15 A.M., you’re in no shape to tell the big hand from the little hand.


The "Newdown," Model RC-6550. Has the "Sure-Awake" alarm. And a 2-stage nightlight so it glows in the dark as brightly as you want.

The "Mornington," Model RC-1296. For people who only listen to your earphone and a 2-stage nightlight.

See the new kind of clock radio today. At any Panasonic dealer. And tomorrow, you won’t have to worry which hand is bigger.

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You can bet that nobody can make a bad martini with Boisiere.

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For—by none other than the Tidlock Corporation, which, it turned out, had also paid for the newspaper ads about the article. It was later disclosed that the "opinion-makers" who received the reprints included 184,667 doctors and other people in the field of medicine; 3,295 people in the communications field; 41,055 biological scientists; 18,819 educators; 10,142 government officials; including the 50 governors, 100 senators, and 432 representatives; 10,173 security analysts; and 123,797 other people, including lawyers, members of Junior Chambers of Commerce, and the like. In addition, three member companies of the Tobacco Institute—the American Tobacco Company, Philip Morris, and R. J. Reynolds—ordered directly from Fawcett two hundred thousand copies, sixty-five thousand one hundred copies, and a hundred and thirty-five thousand copies, respectively, and, on top of this, Reynolds, Loellhorn, Brown & Williamson, and Philip Morris obtained from the Tidlock Corporation a hundred thousand reprints of the article to send to their stockholders, company employees, and sales representatives. The Tobacco Institute and its members must have spent at least a hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars on the True project. Various complaints of unfair trade practices on the part of Tidlock, the Tobacco Institute, and the advertisements of the article were subsequently made to the Federal Trade Commission, and these resulted in an F.T.C. report to Congress. According to the report, which was submitted the following June, the True project had its genesis in discussions between Douglas Kennedy, then the editor of True, and a certain Joseph Field, whom the report identified as a public-relations man on retainer to Brown & Williamson. Field told the F.T.C. investigators that before and after the True article appeared he had sought to get national magazines to run articles presenting the tobacco industry’s views on the subject of smoking and health, and he indicated that after his discussions with Douglas Kennedy, although he was given no commitment that such an article would be printed in True, he approached Stanley Frank, a free-lance writer for popular magazines who had done a number of articles for True, and paid him five hundred dollars to develop such an article. Approval of the idea, and reimbursement of the five hundred dollars, came from Brown & Williamson, Field said. Further inquiry revealed that Field then introduced Frank to an attorney for another tobacco company, and that this attorney supplied Frank with most of the material he used in writing the True article. The article was circulated among Fawcett’s editors, two of whom thought it should be printed. A memorandum from a third editor expanded on favorably, "Andy and Jack think this is great. I find it completely biased, and if actually not bogu, pretty damn misleading."

A fourth editor found Frank’s scientific critique of the Surgeon General’s report and other medical documents somewhat surprising. He commented:

If our old friend [one deleted in the F.T.C. report] had written this long, subscriber plea for the tobacco industry I think at least understand his motives, but coming from Stanley Frank, a man who has spent many more years in baseball dugouts than in laboratories, I am at a loss. Let’s really face it: what’s wrong here is that our writer didn’t go out like a good reporter and do his homework. The result is the truth blond, biased, and without present justification.

For the article, Frank was paid an estimated fee of fifty thousand dollars. (Frank went on to work for Hill & Knowlton, and before the appearance of the article in True, and he is still working there, but there is evidence that Hill & Knowlton supplied the article to True. As a matter of fact, after the revelations about Tidlock’s activities in publishing the True article the Hill & Knowlton people were very unhappy.) Soon after the ramifications of the True article became public, Hill & Knowlton resigned the Tobacco Institute account. (Tidlock and the Tobacco Institute continued relations until the end of 1968.) Not unexpectedly, a number of liberal senators expressed shock at the tactics used by the Tidlock Corporation. However, Reevell said of this little contretemps should be considered. He was doing his best to develop what he seemed to see as some vast new, Western-style, doctors’ plot against the tobacco manufacturers; the business of running an off-screen, print-oriented public-relations campaign was something new to him, and probably, in his innocence, the former prince of the hard sell was merely trying to apply—as far as Tidlock’s part in the True affair went—standards of addressing the public that are perfectly normal and acceptable in the world of television advertising.

Unfortunately as the revelations concerning the True article were for the tobacco industry, they were
followed by even less welcome developments. In February, 1969, the Federal Communications Commission issued a public notice that it intended to propose a rule to ban cigarette advertising from all radio and television broadcasts. Because of the hazard to public health involved in cigarette smoking, it noted, the ruling was called for by the standard of public interest that broadcasters were legally obligated to adhere to. In taking this stand four months before the expiration date, on June 30, 1969, of those provisions in the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 which prohibited the F.C.C. and other regulatory agencies from acting against tobacco advertising on the ground of health, the F.C.C. was basically fulfilling Congress's desire to move against cigarette advertising after June 30th if Congress didn't.

The tobacco-industry people were highly indignant at the F.C.C. statement of intention. The Tobacco Institute issued a statement declaring, "In the present state of scientific knowledge about smoking and health, the ruling contemplated by the F.C.C. would be arbitrary in the extreme." The broadcasters were indignant, too, Vincent T. Waiselwski, the president of the National Association of Broadcasters, issued a statement declaring, "The F.C.C. has arrogated to itself the formulation of a national policy... outside the field of expertise," and calling the policy one that should be left to Congress itself to determine.

And Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Democrat of North Carolina, the tobacco industry's senior defender in Congress, called the F.C.C. proposal "a supreme example of bureaucratic tyranny."

Thus, in the struggle over cigarette advertising the lines were drawn not only between the tobacco interests and the forces concerned with the dangers of cigarette smoking in the public health, and between the broadening of the F.C.C. mission and its mission, but also between Congress and a regulatory agency.

Taking into account that, in addition to the F.C.C. proposal, the Federal Trade Commission had already taken action, the previous year, not only in opposition to the advertising of cigarettes on radio and television, but also that it wished to require a stronger health warning on cigarette packages, the pro-tobacco forces realized that it was most important for them to concentrate on preventing the lapse of the preemption clauses in the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. Furthermore, they knew that a number of bills proposing the restriction of tobacco sales and advertising were being processed in a number of states, and that the plea for the retention of the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did increase the odds that it might be retained in every state and from a patchwork of regulations that would make nationally organized advertising and sales campaigns for cigarettes extremely difficult.

Consequently, great lobbying pressure was exerted by the pro-tobacco forces on members of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which in April held hearings on a number of bills to amend the 1965 Cigarette Act, and on May 28th, a commission, by a vote of two-twos to five, reported out a bill, known as the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Bill, that would have extended the prohibition of any state- or federal-agency intervention against cigarette advertising for six years—a period longer than was sought by the moratorium built into the 1963 act. It looked like a clear victory for the tobacco forces, except for one tactical concession—a recommendation by the committee that a stronger health warning be required on cigarette packages. Instead of reading, "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health," the warning was now to read, "Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health and May Cause Lung Cancer and Other Diseases." In arriving at this wording, the committee rejected a proposal from the Surgeon General himself that the last part of the warning should read, "and May Cause Death from Cancer and Other Diseases." The word "death" made the tobacco people and their allies too unhappy. Even then, certain members of the committee felt that the modified warning was too much for them. Since the label was not required to be placed on the front of the packages, it was thought that it would continue to be put on only in those cases where it would not be visible in cigarette commercials, and since the warning might conceivably help in some measure to relieve the tobacco companies of liability for damages arising out of lawsuits brought by the children of deceased smokers who died of lung cancer, the tobacco men were unmoved about this concession anyway.

The tobacco lobby was under the leadership of Earl C. Clemen, a former Democratic senator from Kentucky.
WHAT THE VERY RICH ALWAYS KNOW ABOUT BARBADOS

It's not just another Caribbean resort for Americans. It's a whole different kind of paradise. You'll find it's got it all: Swimming in the Atlantic, looks inviting. Like surfing on other islands. For our inviting fact-packed island, you'll find it's got it all: Beautiful Barbados. And probably the world's warmest water. And real deep-sea fishing. Plus the freshest air and the best food. And real deep-sea fishing. And horseback-riding along a rugged coast. And probably the world's best scenery. It's got it all. Swingin' on the Hill on their behalf, "American Association of Advertising Agencies has a man sittin' on the scene. He's gettin' something like a hundred grand a year. He has a brand mandate to find out what's going on. He's around and about on the Hill. The individual tobacco companies have some high-priced legal talent watching the scene. The big Washington law firms are right there—for example, Arnold & Porter, which is representing Philip Morris. Those people know their way around Washington. The tobacco companies have other representatives here, too. One of the big tobacco companies has a fellow who, as I understand it, was once a private eye and was hired to catch up with many of the industry's doings a few years ago. He's around, gatherin' intelligence. Then, there are all kinds of little fellows—lobbyists who sign on for a few bucks at one time or another. They'll drop in and make some inroads for Early Clements—that sort of thing. And then there are various people being hired whom we may not see doin' it—lobbyists, fellows taken on to write position papers for the tobacco outfits. The tobacco people have been interested in recruiting some journalistic talent. A science reporter for one Washington paper told me a while ago of getting an offer of forty thousand dollars a year to go to work full time for the Tobacco Institute. The offer was turned down. Of course, Luke Suma, who's the registered lobbyist for the American Tobacco Society, is active on the Hill, too, and so is Banzhof. The broadcasting industry, with almost $1 billion a year in cigarette-advertising accounts at stake, was well represented in Washington during the legislative deliberations. "Vincent Waskulski and other people from the National Association of Broadcasters are very active," I was told. "They're workin' closely with the tobacco people. The broadcasters are trying to put a lot of pressure on the Hill. Congressmen don't like to quarrel with broadcasters, and the broadcasters know that. And on this issue the congressmen are hearin' from their local TV-station owners as well as from the N.A.B."

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embrassing to the broadcasting industry. Representative Brock Adams, of Washington, one of the five committee members who voted against the tobacco interests, turned up evidence from Warren Biren, a former manager of the New York office of the Code Authority, on the extent of the N.A.B.'s self-regulation of cigarette advertising. On June 10th, Biren, who had been disillusioned by his working experience at the Code Authority, testified at a special committee hearing that while Congress had been informed that active and effective self-regulation existed in the N.A.B., the fact was that no such continuing review of cigarette commercials by the N.A.B. was made. Cigarette commercial people as Waskulski had described currently existed, nor was the case since April, 1968, when a meeting between Waskulski and other N.A.B. officials was held to discuss enforcement of the N.A.B. Code as it applied to cigarette advertising. A long ago as 1966, a confidential study made by the Code Authority staff had found that a good deal of cigarette advertising shown on the air could be construed as making smoking attractive and socially acceptable to young people, in violation of the Code Authority's publicly professed determination to see to it that in cigarette commercials "cigarette smoking not be depicted in a manner to impress the youth of our country as a desirable habit worth of imitation." The study, he said, was in effect ignored by the N.A.B. Biren further testified that, subsequent to this study, resistance by television networks and tobacco companies to guidelines for the regulation of the content of tobacco advertising on the air—for example, a proposal to eliminate elements of cigarette commercials in which cigarette smoking was associated with virility and boy-girl romance or worldly success—had defeated the Code Authority, and it could no longer function effectively in policing cigarette advertising on the air. He said that when individual Code Authority members had suggested that the depiction of the act of smoking be abandoned in commercials, "President Waskulski intervened with the argument that such a prescription was 'hypertension,' that it would drastically reduce the appeal of cigarette advertising, and consequently be of no benefit to broadcasters." The proposal thus restriction got nowhere. Biren said that in 1967 Code Authority members were cautioned by the Code Review Board not to be "too rigid" in interpreting the Code Authority's guidelines as they applied to specific commercials, and were advised by Clair McColl-
There is enough Chantilly in this bottle to shake her world.
(And yours.)

Perfume 1 oz. $25. Gift sets from $5 to $25.

Houbigant
Perfumers Since 1711.

lhcrc is
in this bottle
Gift sets from
RERFlJMERS SINCE 1775.
Perfume. 1 oz. $25.
Chan tilly
(And Chur:;
),-

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There is enough Chantilly in this bottle to shake her world.
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There is enough Chantilly in this bottle to shake her world.
(And yours.)

Perfume 1 oz. $25. Gift sets from $5 to $25.

Houbigant
Perfumers Since 1711.
The 'Ice Age' Rum.

When the peaks melt, Myer's won't.

Today everybody drinks with ice. When the ice melts you've got a glass of nothing. Myer's Rum was made for this icy age. In cold, full-bodied, creamy...Even with ice and whatever else you can put into it.

The "Ice Age" Rum.

When the peaks melt, Myer's won't.

Today everybody drinks with ice. When the ice melts you've got a glass of nothing. Myer's Rum was made for this icy age. In cold, full-bodied, creamy...Even with ice and whatever else you can put into it.

These are the Smokehouse® Almonds served on the jets. Crisp and crunchy. Roasted, salted, hickory smoke flavored. You'll find this high-flying treat in stores which stock the better snacks. Look for Smokehouse® Almonds in tins and foil packets with the Blue Diamond emblem. If you can't find them nearby, let us know and we'll send you store names. California Almond Growers Exchange, P.O. Box 1768, Sacramento, California 95808.

was in line with his own prior proposal but also because, if he were to accept it, a great deal of wrangling between the Senate and the House on the subject of tobacco advertising could be prevented. For help in evaluating the plan, Magnuson sent the chief counsel of the Senate Commerce Committee, Michael Perchuck, a lawyer in his mid-thirties, who has a reputation on Capitol Hill of being an extremely knowledgeable man on consumer-affairs legislation, to Dr. Daniel Horn, co-author with Dr. E. Cuyler Hammond of the widely publicized report in 1954 that associated cigarette smoking with the incidence of lung cancer and other diseases. Dr. Horn had been appointed director of the National Clearinghouse on Smoking and Health, an organ of the United States Public Health Service, when it was set up in 1965. Throughout the battle over smoking and health, Magnuson had admired Dr. Horn's ability to assess not only the scientific but also the social problems involved in the continuation of this mass habit. Dr. Horn himself believed that an outright ban on cigarette advertising could not be achieved, confusing the advertising that now done to low-tar-and-nicotine brands had some value, since his own research on smoking habits had shown that for some habitual smokers a switch from high- to low-tar-and-nicotine cigarettes was a way station toward reducing themselves of the habit altogether. Nevertheless, Dr. Horn told Perchuck, whatever value the N.B.C. plan might have in keeping high-tar cigarettes from being advertised on the air, it would in his opinion be entirely offset by the depiction of the act of smoking in those commercials that were put on the air. Horn's studies showed that viewing this act had an unmeasurable effect on the population of people who were trying to cut out smoking. Neatly, Horn reviewed the supposed advantages of the low-tar scheme against the background of what he said was a growing public conviction that cigarette smoking really was harmful to health, and pointed out that many smokers were adjusting their smoking habits accordingly. He said that while he had thought confusing cigarette advertising to the promotion of low-tar-and-nicotine brands might seem a reasonable interim solution to the regulatory problem, the plan was really not a regulatory or scientific one but one of morality: Should the United States government accept the promotion of a habit that had been proved so devastating to the nation's health? After thinking things over, Magnuson decided that the low-tar-and-nicotine advertising scheme wasn't an adequate way of coping with the problem.

At that point, both Senator Magnuson and Senator Moss exerted strong pressure on the broadcasters to come up with more far-reaching concessions on cigarette advertising. They seemed to have also taken advantage of the fact that were beginning to appear in the lobbying alliance between the broadcasters and the tobacco manufacturers. The tobacco people were taken aback by the behavior of the broadcasters in proposing a phaseout of high-tar-and-nicotine advertising. "The conversations of the broadcasters on this matter were in secret. I can't understand their not explaining their intentions to the cigarette industry," a staff member of the Tobacco Institute told me in discussing this development. The tobacco men had another complaint, too. In spite of all the advertising talk about "mildness," many tobacco managers considered the most successful brands of cigarettes on the market to be those with higher, rather than lower, tar and nicotine content. And since the most successful brands were those into which the most promotional and marketing money had already been poured, brand managers in the cigarette business now protested unhappily that scores of millions of promotional dollars that had been spent on television campaigns for particular high-tar brands would be spent in vain if the broadcasters' plan went through.

The broadcasters denied that they had been negotiating in secret to the detriment of their friends in the tobacco business. "The tobacco people know all along what we were doing, but we've never known what they were doing," a man who was involved in the negotiations for the broadcasters told me. In spite of the broadcasters' protestations that they were keeping the tobacco manufacturers informed of their political negotiations, the tobacco manufacturers were for a further shock. Under pressure from the Senate, and out of fear that if federal regulatory agencies stepped in to do something about cigarette advertising on the air a great deal of advertising for other products might suffer the same fate, the broadcasters gave in. On June 8, the National Association of Broadcasters, through its Television Code Review Board, announced a plan to phase out...
putting large advertising
sition in the market and plan
quarrelling among themselves. They
plan would favor the
Trade Commission. July 2nd con-
people was compounded as a result of
print ads. The disarray of the toho-
a declaration made by their own rep-
to head off a situation in which
sellout by their old friends the hardly-
sentiment of what they wished as a
advertising.
phase out was to be
Xtended gave them
imors to put a health warning on
very
cigarette advertising. At the hearing,
ting ecy measures they might have to
discuss among them what recon-
to this pledge—that Congress grant thr
health warnings to be included in all
cigarette advertising. At the hearing,
Thomas Austern, of the powerful
Washington law firm of Covington & Burling, who was representing the
Tobacco Institute, advanced the argu-
ment that any such warning in cigare-
tte advertising was unnecessary, be-
cause all the publicity given in the
main media—including the anti-smoking commercials—to the issue of smoking
and health "demonstrates that the cur-
rent public awareness of the hazard in cigarette smoking is now patent."
"You are everybody knows that ciga-
rette smoking is dangerous to health?" Commissioner Philip Elian asked the
Tobacco Institute counsel.
"Yes, I will take it on that issue, sir," Austern replied, indicating that he
intended to use this premise in his argu-
ment, and he did.
After all the years and all the mil-
lions of dollars that the industry had
devoted to denying the validity of the
individual reports of these hazards, this
was a horrifying argument for the tu-
hoes men to see reported in the news.
It was so horrifying, in fact, that one
official of the Tobacco Institute with
whom I hoped to discuss the subject a
month later reacted to my mention of
it as though the Institute's counsel had
never advanced such an argument at
all. He was the Institute's public-rela-
tions director, and he may have just
blocked it out of his mind.

Whatever the tobacco people talk
Mr. Austern's characteriza-
tion of the effects of cigarettes on smokers, there
was no doubt that they were
increasingly worried about the
effects of anti-smoking
merchandisers on smokers and
potential smokers. "The
anti-smoking spots are dead-
fully effective," a staff member of the
Tobacco Institute remarked to me one
day that summer, and a few days later
a former executive of a major tobacco
company who had just been removed
from his organization in a result of a
corporate merger, and was consequent-
ly feeling a bit disillusioned about the
tobacco business, told me, "The indus-
try considers that the anti-smoking
merchandisers, on top of the tremendous
anti-smoking campaigns that have been
mounted in the public schools, the
Public Health Service and the various
health organizations, and this on top of
all the other undesirable public
smoking, are really hurting. In fact,
the opinion of many top-level tobacco
people is that as things sound they'll not
as now have cigarette commercials
banned altogether if by that they could
in effect get the anti-smoking
merchandisers banned, too."
Whatever their considerations were, the tobacco forces argued themselves for a heavy coun-
terattack against the broadcasters. On
July 22nd, at a hearing of the Senate
Commerce Committee's Consumer
Brotherink, Joseph P. Callanan III,
head of Philip Morris, promised, on be-
half of the nine leading cigarette manu-
facturers in the country, to end all cig-
arette advertising on radio and television
by the 1973 deadline proposed by the
broadcasters but by September
1970. He attached only one condition
to this pledge—that Congress grant the
smoke-manufacturing industry in this
case, from the antitrust laws, under
which they might be charged with re-
turning trade by thus acting in con-
cent.

Callanan went even further. He in-
formed the subcommittee that if the
broadcasters would release the tobacco

Only three more
Christmases
till Tuesday.

We keep taking the long view. This year,
Christmas falls on a Friday, the year after on a
Saturday, the year after that on a Monday.
But in 1973, it's a whole new
ball game.

Meanwhile, Tuesday (every
Tuesday) remains the official day to
savour Teacher's Scotch, the cream
of Highland whiskies. Fortunately,
there's nothing in the rule book that says
Teacher's can't be given on a Friday. Or
any other day of the week, for that
matter. Keep the faith.

Teacher's

The Scotch that made Tuesday famous

8D Proof Scotch Whisky Blended and Bottled in Scotland by Wm. Teacher & Sons, Ltd. ©Eisheiff & Co., N.Y., Importers

MONSIEUR DE GIVENCHY

On the continent, a man's fragrance must be subtle, discreet
and generally, to be useful effec-
tiveness de Div-
ency is just not.
In America, Mr. Shaver Na-
voez—from the
collection for
Durock, Inc. in the

The Scotch that made Tuesday famous

8D Proof Scotch Whisky Blended and Bottled in Scotland by Wm. Teacher & Sons, Ltd. ©Eisheiff & Co., N.Y., Importers

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Teacher's

The Scotch that made Tuesday famous

8D Proof Scotch Whisky Blended and Bottled in Scotland by Wm. Teacher & Sons, Ltd. ©Eisheiff & Co., N.Y., Importers
If you've ever tasted a chocolate covered cherry you've almost tasted Cheri-Suisse.

But our Swiss version isn't so sweet and innocent. Enjoy it after dinner. Over ice. Or to perk up a party.

---

This is why 600,000 people have become Foster Parents.

If it weren't for this child's Foster Parents, her own mother would have no-one to turn to for guidance, no one to teach her a trade and help her escape the endless cycle of poverty.

And Chui Mei could never have written to say thank you, I love you, to her Foster Parents because her life would never have reached anything to be thankful for.

When someone cares, somewhere someone cares.
How to gain the advantages of investment management for a $5,000 to $50,000 portfolio

If the money you have today is going to grow in the future toward new income, or for education, travel, leisure, retirement, or other investment goals, you may want to make the best use of your time to achieve your investment goals.

The President of the A.P.C., Leonard H. Goldenson, said, too, he was 

How to gain the advantages of investment management for a $5,000 to $50,000 portfolio

If the money you have today is going to grow in the future toward new income, or for education, travel, leisure, retirement, or other investment goals, you may want to make the best use of your time to achieve your investment goals.

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The President of the A.P.C., Leonard H. Goldenson, said, too, he was
The world is alpinre quality. Discover it at L. Magnin.

Copenhagen's Town Hall

This is the Server Cellarette from Davis Storv.

DAVIS Storv, Nashville, Tenn.

This is the Server Cellarette from Davis Storv.

DAVIS, Nashville, Tenn.

TWO THINGS FOR WHICH A MAN IS GRATEFUL...

His Woman and his Scotch.

100 PIPERS • WANTED British Whisky

Birger Christensen
38 Ostergade, Copenhagen, Denmark

Davis makes lasting impressions in solid wood.

This is the Server Cellarette from Davis Storv.

DAVIS Storv, Nashville, Tenn.

It's made. proudly. Give it that way.
The tobacco lobbyist swung enough votes in the committee to bring about a change in the text of the existing warning label required on cigarette packages. At first, the committee (bypassing the text required in the House bill) decided to alter the text of the existing warning on cigarette packages from “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health” to “Warning: Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.” When the tobacco lobbyists learned about that, they put enough pressure on so that the committee changed its mind, and, by a narrow voice, further amended the notice to read, “Warning: Excessive Cigarette Smoking Is Hazardous to Your Health.” Thus was a considerable gain for the tobacco lobby, because the use of the word “excessive” made the warning imply that normal smoking wasn’t dangerous to health—which was not what the Surgeon General’s report had said. What the Surgeon General’s report had said was that cigarette smoking in normal amounts wasn’t indeed dangerous to health.

The amended bill came to a vote in the Senate on December 12th. Before it did, Sponsors Magnussen and Moss had launched a battle against the de facto health warning on the cigarette packages, and won. Though further amendments, they obtained the elimination of the word “excessive,” and they also managed to have revised by one year the period during which the F.T.C. was forbidden to require a health warning in all cigarette advertising. The F.T.C. could require this warning, after giving Congress six months notice of its intention to do so, after July 1, 1971. In addition, the Commission would be permitted to impose certain other restrictions on cigarette advertising, such as that tobacco and nicotine content of the brands concerned be included. The bill was passed by a vote of seventy to seven, and it was then sent to House and Senate conference for a recommendation of differences between the two versions. The broadcasters were sent to work on the confer ence in a final attempt to delay the cutoff date for cigarette commercials to September 1, 1971. What they finally got was a delay of one day—from midnight of December 31, 1970, to midnight of January 1, 1971—which enabled them to cash in on cigarette commercials during the football bowl games on New Year’s Day. The victory was a far cry from the millions of dollars that a nine-month extension would have given the broadcasters, but it was something.

And the broadcasters had not yet finished with the tobacco people. Now that there wasn’t going to be as much money to be made out of cigarette commercials, the broadcasters began to think that there might, after all, be an ethical issue involved in promoting cigarettes. After Brown’s revelations, the N.A.B. Code Authority people finally went through the motions of tightening up their cigarette-advertising guidelines, and in December the American Tobacco Company tried to get a court injunction to prevent the N.A.B. from adopting certain of these guidelines, whereupon a N.A.B. lawyer collecting depositions from witnesses at a pre-trial hearing put a long series of questions concerning the morality of advertising cigarettes to Philip Cohen, the director of advertising for American Tobacco. Attorneys for American Tobacco would allow Cohen to answer only one of them, which was put to him by a lawyer representing C.B.S. and ran as follows: “Do you assume that there is a relationship between smoking and health, or do you assume there is no relationship?” Cohen replied, “We don’t make any assumptions. We prepare advertising that is calculated to sell the market.”

On April 1, 1970, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act was at last signed into law by President Nixon. In form, it had been changed very little in the House-Senate conference, but the wording of the cautionary label on cigarette packages had again been altered. It now read, “Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Hazardous to Your Health.”

TWENTY years ago, when television was just getting under way in this country and the tobacco companies were beginning to pour big money into commercials, advertising men in the Madison Avenue agencies that had cigarette accounts were working full time to convert themselves from the static visual forms of printed advertising to the visual and aural mobility of the new medium. Young copywriters...
ICED CREME (De Kuyper's delicious instead-of-dessert dessert)

Refreshing after-dinner idea—with a touch of Old World elegance. Green Creme de Menthe or caramel ice cream or on the rocks. It's more than delicious—It's De Kuyper.

(Say it like the Dutch do: De-ki-per.)

**DECEMBER 19, 1970**

consider themselves bound under the F.C.C. fairness doctrine to grant the anti-smoking forces, free of charge, that seven-five million dollars a year. That is to say, in the form of television advertising and promotion—more elaborate displays in supermarkets, and so forth. It is not possible, however, for these tobacco companies to spend more money on their sales forces that deal with cigarette retailers, and of bigger sales incentives to both wholesalers and retailers. They can go on with little cigarette-brand promotions, in areas like sports. Thus, Philip Morris is undertaking a series of tournaments for women tennis players, to be known as the Virginia Slims International Tournaments.

(Promisingly, the progress of the tournaments will be reported on television, and viewers will thus continue to hear the words "Virginia Slims" over the tube.) Outside the magazine and newspaper, the most visible use of the television-commercial money will be on outdoor billboards. It has been estimated in the New York Times that the total tobacco companies will carry as much as forty million dollars on billboard advertising in 1970.

However, some tobacco companies are also participating in cigarette advertising through the tobacco companies, at least the major ones. They may have no more than 10 percent of their total annual advertising revenue through the advertising on television networks, and are now attempting to transfer the loss of their tobacco advertising by unloading their time on television stations on a variety of programs. A few years ago, they were the only ones that would accept the advertising on television, but now, even some of the bigger networks accept the tobacco companies.

Whatever the tobacco companies manage to do, it will be difficult for them to compete with the increased use of cigarette advertising, which is expected to increase in the years to come. However, the tobacco companies are also participating in cigarette advertising on television networks, and are now attempting to transfer the loss of their tobacco advertising by unloading their time on television stations.
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In the elegant just-right length, with underscoring outline in white mink, unfolding petal collar.

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considerably cheaper per centimeter of cigarette than tobacco, and which, given the right advertising agency, can be merchandised—ninthousand-metre cigarettes, for example—at higher prices. In summary, then, what has happened since 1963 is that the total amount of cigarette tobacco per capita consumed by the adult population has fallen off by close to twenty percent, and that in return for this the tobacco companies have been selling slightly more cigarettes, continuing considerably less tobacco, more filters, and more air, at higher prices than ever.

But the less actual tobacco people smoke, the less stubborn their habitation to cigarettes tends to be. It seems inescapable that in spite of the huge momentum that the tobacco industry has achieved in promoting cigarettes over the past half century, using every medium of persuasion, including television (into which it has poured a total of perhaps three billion dollars of advertising money in twenty years), the whole pattern of cigarette smoking within the adult population is now changing significantly. Dr. Kohn has calculated that between 1964 and 1970 the total number of smokers in the adult population has dropped from forty-nine million to forty-four million.

At the same time, his calculations indicate, the number of former smokers in the adult population has risen from thirteen million to twenty-nine million. Dr. Kohn estimates that since 1964 one smoker in five has quit the habit. And although, at an earlier period—for example, in the period immediately after the Surgeon General's 1964 report on smoking and health—most people who cut out the habit tended to be above average in education and earning power, Dr. Kohn believes that giving up the cigarette habit is now occurring at increasing rates in the adult population generally, and that it is occurring at significant levels among women as well as among men (although women smokers appear to have a harder time cutting than men), and also among younger adults, although there seems to have been a slight increase in the smoking rate among teenagers during the last two years.

When one takes into account the commercial force that the tobacco companies have brought to bear in our society over the years to promote brands of cigarettes, and all the lobbying they have done, and all the influence they have exerted on the Administration and the Congress, it is not very surprising that although the total excise duty among regular smokers since the time of the Surgeon General's report in 1964 must have increased by the hundreds of millions, the tobacco and broadcasting people were nonetheless able to long to persuade the House of Representatives to vote a ban on effective regulation of cigarette advertising on the air, a change that is remarkably possible in the tobacco companies cannot be aware of it. However, obscure their leaders have been in public in denying the harmfulness of cigarette smoking, and however determined they are to continue promoting cigarettes by every means at their disposal, the tobacco companies have been steadily diversifying their activities over the past two or three years. The American Tobacco Company has become a subsidiary of American Brands, Inc., and handles manufacturing, Pall Mall, Tarleton, Lucky Strike, and Silva King cigarettes it manufactures a number of food products, including Sunshine Crackers and Cookies, Motz's Fruits and Fruit Juices, and Sunnysweet Fruits and Fruit Juices, and has announced its intention of taking over the Jergens Company, which puts out Jergens Lotion and Woodbury Soap. Two of the largest tobacco companies have dropped the word "tobacco" from their corporate names. Thus, the Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company has become just Liggett & Myers, Inc., and in addition to making L&M, Lark, and Clarinet cigarettes it now puts out Alpo Dog Foods and Cream of Oats. And the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company recently changed its name to R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., the renamed company is to continue to proclaim that Winston tastes good like a cigarette should. It is also perfecting the taste of such products as Crown King Oriental Foods, Hawaiian Punch, Frazzle Rabbit Meatballs, and My-T-Fine desert. It is now also manufacturing the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation retains its name, but it is now in the pickled-fish business as well as in the tobacco business.

On the whole, the manufacture and promotion of cigarettes are likely to be highly profitable for some time. But tobacco companies that will have diversified to the point where their tobacco products are no longer their major source of income will not be likely, if they are faced with financial problems, to make any sacrifices for the sake of a product whose sales aren't expanding, particularly when that product breathes an air of trouble that might somehow...
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